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Darden, and Craver,3 I show this is not the case for social
mechanistic explanation. Having thus discounted regularities
as one source of evidence for the causal productivity of a
social mechanism, I then turn to a common argument in the
process tracing literature: that a social mechanism can be sup-
ported by observing the implications of its components, i.e.
causal process observations, in a particular case study4. I ar-
gue that this too is insufficient evidence for productive conti-
nuity. Finally, I show that counterfactual evidence can provide
evidence of the productive continuity of a social mechanism. I
make the notion of counterfactual evidence more concrete by
adopting the interventionist theory of causation set out by
James Woodward.5
2. MDC’s theory
Philosophers of science Machamer, Darden, and Craver (herein
“MDC”) characterize causal mechanisms6 as “entities and ac-
tivities organized such that they are productive of regular
changes from start or set-up to finish or termination condi-
tions.”7 Entities and activities are linked in productive continu-
ity and the activities occur regularly, not just in one case, but
in other cases too. I will discuss in detail what this regularity
entails in section 3. For now, take the example of a biological
causal mechanism of chemical neurotransmission. In this
mechanism, “a presynaptic neuron transmits a signal to a post-
synaptic neuron by releasing neurotransmitter molecules that
diffuse across the synaptic cleft, bind to receptors, and so
depolarize the post-synaptic cell.”8 Chemical neurotransmiss-
ion’s entities include such things as the presynaptic and post-
synaptic neuron. Entities, simply speaking, are things; they
have a spatiotemporal location, and we can distinguish them
in a straightforward way from other entities. Entities are inter-
dependent with the other part of a mechanism, the activities.
The activities of the chemical neurotransmission mechanism
3
 cf. Bogen 2005, 2008, Machamer 2004, Woodward 2002.
4
 The type of process tracing I am concerned with here fits best
with what is called theory-testing process tracing (Beach and Pedersen
2013), in which one traces a causal mechanism through case-specific
observable implications of this mechanism’s existence, or top-down
process tracing (Bennett and Checkel 2015), in which one tests type-
level causal hypotheses about the mechanisms producing a particular
“process” with case study data.
5
 Woodward 2003.
6
 Note that MDC specialize in philosophy of biology, particularly
molecular biology and neurobiology. MDC express the suspicion
however that their analysis “is applicable to many other sciences,
and maybe even to cognitive or social mechanisms” (Machamer,
Darden, and Craver 2000, 2). My conclusions about social mecha-
nisms further on in this paper will show the scope of MDC’s theory
is more limited than they suspect; MDC’s new mechanist philoso-
phy may not reach far beyond biology.
7
 Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, 3. Several process tracing
methodologists have taken inspiration from the MDC conceptual-
ization of mechanisms. Beach and Pedersen, for instance, write that
“[e]ach of the parts of the causal mechanism can be conceptualized as
composed of entities that undertake activities” (Beach and Pedersen
2013, 29).
8
 Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, 3.
1. Introduction
In this paper, I conceptualize the notion of the productive
continuity of a social mechanism. The continuity of a mecha-
nism refers to the fact that each part of that mechanism should
be causally connected to another; no part of the mechanism is
isolated. Moreover, each part of the mechanism should pro-
duce, i.e. cause, the next part1. The productive continuity of
mechanisms forms an important part of philosophers of sci-
ence Machamer, Darden, and Craver (MDC)’s “new mecha-
nist” conceptualization of biological mechanisms.2
Several process tracing methodologists have taken inspi-
ration from the MDC conceptualization of mechanisms and the
concept of productive continuity. Though I accept the notion
of productive continuity as crucial for social mechanisms as it
is for biological mechanisms, I will show that the way one
corroborates the productive continuity of social mechanisms
is different from the way one corroborates it for biological
mechanisms.
Philosophers of causal mechanisms disagree on what ex-
actly productive continuity entails. I will consider two com-
mon answers, regularities and causal process observations,
before presenting my own, counterfactuals. While regulari-
ties, i.e. the recurrence of activities in other cases, are deemed
necessary for biological mechanistic explanation by Machamer,
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1
 Though productive continuity is a property of causal mecha-
nisms themselves, one can also demand the productive continuity of
a description of a causal mechanism between some putative cause and
effect of interest. If a description of a mechanism is unclear about
how certain parts of the mechanism are linked to the rest, that de-
scription does not satisfactorily explain the relation between the
cause and effect under study.
2
 Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000.
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include diffusion and depolarization. The properties of the
entities constrain what kind of activities they can undertake,
and the kinds of activities undertaken constrain what kinds of
properties the entities can have. MDC see activities as types
of causes (i.e. as ‘productive’); they “are producers of change;
they are constitutive of the transformations that yield new
states of affairs.”9
MDC argue that entities and activities are linked in what
MDC call “productive continuity”: 10
Complete descriptions of mechanisms exhibit productive
continuity without gaps from the set up to termination
conditions. Productive continuities are what make the con-
nections between stages intelligible. If a mechanism is
represented schematically by , then the conti-
nuity lies in the arrows and their explication is in terms of
the activities that the arrows represent. A missing arrow,
namely, the inability to specify an activity, leaves an ex-
planatory gap in the productive continuity of the mecha-
nism.
Productive continuity is thus central to causal mechanistic
explanation. If we cannot determine that one stage of the mecha-
nism, A, led to the next, B, we do not know whether A is truly
causally connected to B. However, as stated in the introduc-
tion, philosophers of causal mechanisms disagree on what
exactly productive continuity entails, and this will concern me
in what follows. I will now consider two common answers,
regularities and causal process observations, before present-
ing my own, counterfactuals.
3. Support for the productive continuity of
social mechanisms
3.1 Productive continuity supported by regularities
According to MDC, biological mechanisms only explain the
link between a putative cause and effect of interest because
the activities in these mechanisms are “regular,” i.e. because
activities “work always or for the most part in the same way
under the same conditions.”11 In other words, the same activ-
ity working in some other biological system but in the same
context will produce the same effect. The separate activities
that together make up the mechanism of chemical neurotrans-
mission (e.g. diffusion, depolarization) will operate in the same
way in like circumstances. Chemical neurotransmission is there-
fore regular in the sense that it happens between many differ-
ent sets of neurons in different biological systems to the same
effect.
However, not every new mechanist philosopher accepts
MDC’s claim that regularity is necessary for productive conti-
nuity, and thereby for mechanistic explanation more generally.
James Bogen suggests that although entities and activities are
indeed organized so that they are productive of changes, these
changes do not need to be regular.12 After all, Bogen argues,
9
 Darden 2008, 962.
10
 Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, 3.
11
 Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, 3.
12
 Bogen 2005 and 2008.
there exist irregularly operating and stochastic activities and
mechanisms, as well as activities and mechanisms that operate
just once. Though, in Bogen’s words, MDC believe that “gen-
eralizations describing natural regularities are essential com-
ponents of causal explanations,”13 he argues that “causal pro-
ductivity and regularity are by no means the same thing.”14
Another way of interpreting Bogen’s argument is as fol-
lows. Although the existence of regularities is one source of
evidence for the causal productivity of a mechanism—since
such regularities provide evidence that the link between some
parts of the mechanism is genuinely causal—this is not the
only source of evidence for productive continuity. It would be
misleading to think so, since excluding other sources of evi-
dence means we cannot consider singly occurring activities as
genuinely causal.
Let me now turn to why we ought to reject regularities as
a key source of evidence for the productive continuity of so-
cial mechanisms. First, consider MDC’s characterization of
activities in terms of recurrence, i.e. as types of causes that
describe something that acts “in the same way under the same
conditions.”15 A presynaptic neuron’s release of neurotrans-
mitter molecules will take place in many such neurons in the
body, and always in the same way, by virtue of the uniformity
of such neurons.
However, the same demand for recurrence of the activity
in other cases leads to difficulty in fields like political science.
Arguably, there are no such causally homogeneous, stable
entities and activities across a range of political science cases.
Units in social science mechanisms are not as clearly defined
as biological entities; we cannot easily rely on a spatiotempo-
ral location or set of boundaries to distinguish social “enti-
ties” and, similarly, social activities are not as straightforwardly
defined as are biological activities. There is, for instance, no
reason to believe that a democratic government will always act
in a similar way unless the same conditions are spelled out in
excessive detail. There are more salient differences between
different democratic governments’ actions than there are be-
tween the body’s different presynaptic neurons’ release of
neurotransmitters.
In order to rely on regularities, one requires what Gerring
has called “descriptive comparability,” the causal factors X
and effects of interest Y must “mean roughly the same thing
across cases.”16 Finding descriptive comparability is particu-
larly difficult to accomplish in the social sciences, since in
social science we are dealing with aggregate, social, non-indi-
vidual concepts,17 what elsewhere has been described as
“fuzzy” or “Ballung” concepts.18 Consider, for instance, the
activity concept making public a blue book, one of the key
activities in the causal process that Kenneth Schultz claims
linked the events behind Britain’s successful use of coercive
13
 Bogen 2005, 397.
14
 Bogen 2005, 397.
15
 Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, 3.
16
 Gerring 2005, 184.
17
 cf. Kincaid 2009.
18
 Cartwright and Bradburn 2011, Cartwright and Runhardt 2014.
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diplomacy during the Fashoda crisis.19 The blue book con-
tained all the exchanges between Britain and France and com-
municated to the British public the uncompromising position
of the government firsthand, which in turn made it difficult for
the government to renege on their position without incurring
substantial political costs. Although one may speak of this
activity more generally (there have been other instances in
which a government made public their position in such a way),
there is no reason to assume that publishing a blue book hap-
pens always or for the most part in the same way under the
same conditions, nor is there reason to assume that it always
or for the most part has the same effect. Thus, it is difficult to
see how a regularity, as defined by MDC, could be used to
establish with certainty the causal productivity of Schultz’s
purported causal process.
Note that this is not to say that general principles like
regularities can never play a role in finding evidence for the
productive continuity of a social mechanism. We may rely on
more general political science studies to establish that, indeed,
reneging on promises made in a blue book incurs great politi-
cal costs. However, such principles won’t take the form of
MDC’s regularities, e.g., that making public a blue book “works
always or for the most part in the same way under the same
conditions.” I will outline, in section 3.3.1 of this paper, the role
of such general principles in providing evidence for produc-
tive continuity.
The second reason to reject regularities as necessary for
social mechanistic explanation is as follows. In biology, we
may see a straightforward relation between one mechanism
and the process observed in a particular instance, e.g. the
mechanism of protein synthesis in general and the production
of a protein in a particular cell under study. In the social sci-
ences, things are less straightforward. Consider, for instance,
Elisabeth Wood’s study of mobilization into the Frente
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) rebel
forces during the Salvadoran Civil War.20 Wood argues that
rural people mobilized because of three mechanisms: because
they came to value participation per se, because of “defiance”
(a refusal to acquiesce), and because of “pleasure of agency”
(the “positive affect associated with self-determination, au-
tonomy, self-esteem, efficacy, and pride that come from the
successful assertion of intention”21). Although each of the
three mechanisms may individually recur in other case studies,
and thus have some degree of generality beyond the El Salva-
dor study, the chain of events in El Salvador was a unique
result; the same process has not recurred in the same way in
other conflicts. The causal mechanisms that Wood stipulates
have interacted with the particular background conditions in
El Salvador to produce this unique, single case and its entities’
activities. To establish that the process in Wood’s study has
productive continuity, i.e. that each part of the mechanism is
causally related to (produces) the next, one cannot rely on the
straightforward relation between one mechanism and one pro-
19
 Schultz 2001.
20
 Wood 2003.
21
 Wood 2003, 235.
cess as in biology.
To sum up, many of the processes traced in process trac-
ing studies seemingly occur only once, and there is reason to
believe that one can always find causally relevant differences
between, for example, two conflicts, or one conflict at different
points in time. Moreover, MDC’s regularities often cannot sup-
port the productive continuity of a social mechanism due to a
lack of straightforward descriptive comparability between ac-
tivities. As such, regularities as described by MDC are, at best,
a possible but not necessary source of evidence for produc-
tive continuity.
3.2 Productive continuity supported by observable implica-
tions
Regularities, then, often cannot provide evidential support for
the productive continuity of social mechanisms in the way
MDC claim they do for biological mechanisms. Let us now
consider a second source of evidential support for productive
continuity from the methodological literature.
Conceptualizing top-down process tracing, methodolo-
gists like Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel22 argue that one
should first formulate a hypothesis about what may be the
cause of an observed effect, and by what mechanisms cause
and effect are connected. One should subsequently try to pro-
vide support for one’s own hypothesis, as well as refute any
existing rival hypotheses, in a case study, using the observ-
able implications of the hypothesized mechanisms. The ob-
servable implications of the mechanism are generally called
‘causal process observations’ (CPOs) in the literature.23 We
can think of CPOs as the salient observations a process tracer
uses to evaluate a causal hypothesis. Bennett and Checkel
define the observable implications of mechanisms as “the facts
and sequences within a case that should be true if each of the
alternative hypothesized explanations of the case is true. Which
actors should have known, said, and did what, and when?
Who should have interacted with, worried about, or allied with
whom?”24
As an example, consider Kristin Bakke’s 2013 study of
tactical innovation during the Chechen wars.25 Bakke hypoth-
esizes transnational insurgents could have influenced local
fighters through two mechanisms: relational and mediated dif-
fusion. To show that mediated diffusion and relational diffu-
sion were indeed behind the radicalization of tactics in
Chechnya, Bakke deduces several observable implications that
should be true if these mechanisms were present. First, she
shows the right background conditions were present to make
diffusion aimed at a radicalization of tactics possible (e.g. local
fighters accepted the idea of direct attacks against civilians
more over time); second, one of the most prominent hostage
crises took place after training camps and schools had been
set up by transnationals and, as such, the chronology fits;
third, Bakke presents some evidence that radical tactics were
22
 Bennett and Checkel 2015.
23
 See Brady and Collier 2010.
24
 Bennett and Checkel 2015, 30.
25
 Bakke 2013.
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being communicated to the local insurgents in these training
camps and schools (e.g. evidence that hostage techniques
were taught there and that videos were produced that taught
suicide tactics).
The difficulty, however, with focusing on CPOs as evi-
dence for process hypotheses, is that such evidence for the
observable implications of mechanisms does not necessarily
provide support for the causal connection between the steps
of the process.26 In other words, CPOs alone do not necessar-
ily support the productive continuity of the mechanism. In
Bakke, for instance, evidence for productive continuity is thin
on the ground. All that is required for Bakke, it seems, is that
we observe the deductive implications of her hypothesized
mechanisms in a case study. Yet it is less satisfying to state, for
instance, that schools and training camps were built between
the arrival of transnational insurgents and the use of radical
tactics, than it is to clearly link that it was in those schools and
training camps that local insurgents became convinced that
using, for example, suicide bombings is an effective and ac-
ceptable tactic.
In other words, if productive continuity is what one is
looking for, CPOs are not the (best) way forward.  CPOs do not
commonly provide support for productive continuity, since
they are not focused on providing support for the causal con-
nection between the links of a causal chain. In general, listing
the observable implications of a mechanism’s entities and ac-
tivities alone is not enough evidence to show that a putative
cause and effect are indeed connected. Further evidence is
necessary to show that each event on the chain is causally
connected to the events that directly precede and succeed it.
3.3 Productive continuity supported by counterfactuals
Now that we have seen regularities are unlikely to provide
support for the productive continuity of social mechanisms,
and that the use of causal process observations alone is insuf-
ficient, in the remainder of this paper I will consider a third
source of evidence process tracers may use to support pro-
ductive continuity: counterfactuals, as per James Woodward’s
interventionist theory of causation.
Woodward has argued that any successful description of
a cause-effect relationship must refer to causal factors that can
be manipulated to change the phenomenon under study.27
Specifically, X is a cause of Y if there exists some ‘intervention’
I that we can use to change X, so that X will then, in turn,
change Y without any interference of other factors linked to Y.
In other words, using I, we can ascertain that X made the change
in Y happen. As I have shown in earlier work,28 Woodward’s
theory implies that if we cannot specify an ‘intervention’ for
each separate link of the chain of events, then these links are
not genuinely causal, and the process-tracing argument will
fail. Evidence for interventions can support the productive
continuity of social mechanisms, because it gives evidence for
the arrows in a process .
26
 cf. Runhardt 2015.
27
 Woodward 2003.
28
 Runhardt 2015.
Woodward’s is a counterfactual theory of causation,29 and
methodologists have previously considered what counter-fac-
tual evidence one may employ to support causal claims in the
social sciences.30 A counterfactual is commonly defined to be
a claim of the form “If it had been the case that C (or not C), it
would have been the case that E (or not E).”31 These frame-
works, however, lack the concrete (Bayesian) evidential tests
discussed by later process tracing methodologists.32 Wood-
ward’s theory on the other hand can be adapted to provide
such a test.
In the Bakke study discussed above, the Woodwardian
recommendation would be to go beyond the observable impli-
cations evidence (the CPOs) and show that e.g. if the local
insurgents had not watched instructional videos on suicide
tactics, then they would not have used such tactics during
later incidents. The intervention, here, is a technical way of
conceptualizing the evidence one should provide to support
this counterfactual.33 We would need to come up with an inter-
vention that prevents the locals from watching the videos,
which in turn would prevent the use of such tactics. In particu-
lar, Bakke needs to ask, could we have prevented the local
insurgents from watching suicide bombing videos, in a way
that will not by itself increase the use of radical tactics? (If we
can only prevent the locals from watching suicide bombing
videos by giving them a different source of information on
such tactics, this arguably implies that they would have been
led to using radical tactics regardless of watching the videos.)
Would they have used suicide bombings less if we had pre-
vented them from watching such videos?
There are several kinds of interventions, according to
Woodward’s theory: the actual (human) intervention, the natu-
ral intervention, and the theoretical intervention. In the par-
ticular context of Bakke’s work, a human intervention (akin to
29
 My demand for further counterfactual evidence for the links of
the causal chain fits with Stathis Psillos’ distinction between mecha-
nistic and counterfactual causation, and his belief that mechanistic
causal claims must rely on counterfactual causal claims (Psillos 2004).
30
 cf. Fearon 1991, Tetlock & Belkin 1996.
31
 Fearon 1991, 169.
32
 cf. Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bennett and Checkel 2015.
33
 In Woodward’s framework, I is an intervention for this causal
relation if, firstly, I causes viewing of videos of suicide bombings;
secondly, I acts as a switch for the local insurgents’ increased use of
suicide bombings (i.e., makes whether the insurgents use this tactic
independent of any other influences); thirdly, I does not directly or
indirectly cause the increased use of suicide bombings itself; fourthly,
I is statistically independent of any factor A not on the path I       Z       Y
that links the viewing of videos of suicide bombings, Z, to the in-
creased use of suicide bombings, Y. One should show that all four
requirements are met by a (theoretical) intervention if it is to be
accepted as evidence for a process hypothesis. For more details, see
Runhardt (2015). (These strict requirements put on an intervention
also imply that even in cases of redundancy, we can assess whether
the putative cause was indeed causally relevant. These cases are
caught under the second requirement, which fixes other influences on
the effect of interest. As such, being explicit about the requirements
one puts on an intervention responds to Beach’s (2016) objection
that counterfactual accounts break down in cases of redundancy.)
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an experiment in which the putative cause is actually inter-
vened upon, e.g. in which we physically prevent the locals
from watching the videos) is impossible, and more generally
speaking, many process tracing case studies are unlikely to be
compatible with this technique. A natural intervention relies
on finding a sufficiently similar case in which the cause was
not present, to see what would happen to the effect. In Bakke’s
case, one would need to find a (set of) conflict(s) that are
similar in every other way to the Second Chechen War, but
where e.g. transnational insurgents are not present. For rea-
sons mentioned above, it is unlikely that Bakke would find
such a comparable case.
As such, the most likely type of intervention from
Woodward’s framework that may provide us with a concrete
(Bayesian) evidential test is the theoretical intervention: a
process tracer would have to establish the counterfactual claim
of what would happen under an intervention if it were to be put
in place. Woodward suggests that one way of doing so is
through a hypothetical experiment. One would have to formu-
late an appropriate hypothetical experiment for the causal claim
one is testing, following the definition of an intervention vari-
able I have described above. Then, one would collect data that
tells us “what the results of the (…) hypothetical experiment
would be if we were to perform the experiment, although in fact
we don’t or can’t actually perform the experiment.”34
As an indication of how one may go about such a hypo-
thetical experiment, consider Bakke’s study again. She makes
her causal claim regarding diffusion more salient by a counter-
factual remark: “Suicide terrorism, in contrast [to hostage tak-
ing], does not have a local historical template among the
Chechens, despite centuries of conflict with central rulers. Thus
in the absence of outside influence, it is unlikely that the
Chechens would have turned to such a tactic.”35 But it is only
a remark. Establishing this counterfactual would be one way of
corroborating what would happen under an intervention if it
were to be put in place, i.e. what would happen if the Chechens
had not been influenced by outside agents.
In order to establish this counterfactual, Bakke’s assump-
tion must be that the Chechens before the arrival of the
transnational insurgents are sufficiently similar to the Chechens
after the arrival of the transnational insurgents, and thus that
the diffusion mechanisms that the transnational insurgents
set in motion are the only cause of radicalization. Therefore, if
there had been no transnational insurgents, nothing else would
have caused the radicalization, and we would not have seen
any use of suicide terrorism.
Note that, in order to support such a detailed hypothetical
intervention claim, and avoid black-boxing the links between
watching videos and using suicide tactics,36 it is crucial that
one is as detailed as possible. One must make explicit “what it
is about one part that links it in a causal sense to the next
part.”37
34
 Woodward 2015, 3587.
35
 Bakke 2013, 58.
36
 Beach’s (2016) criticism, in this symposium, is that counterfactual
understandings of mechanisms black-box or mask causal logics.
37
 See Beach (2016) in this symposium.
Now let us briefly consider how a theoretical intervention
may fit in with the evidential framework of later process tracing
methodologists, particularly with the Van Evera terminology
adopted by, amongst others, Beach and Pedersen, and Bennett
and Checkel.38
Woodward’s framework for causation tells us that if an
intervention for the relation X    Y can be shown to exist, X
causes Y. This definition, in Woodward’s theory, means that if
one finds an intervention I which answers to these criteria, it is
unavoidable that X causes Y. In theory, our subjective prob-
ability in that causal claim should be raised to 1. Finding an
intervention is a sufficient but not necessary test that sub-
stantially raises our subjective probability for the causal claim.
Failure to find an intervention does not give us a reason to
adjust our subjective probability for the causal claim one way
or the other. As such, Woodward’s intervention fits perfectly
with the smoking gun test.39
There are, however, limitations to the use of interventions
as described above. Though in theory finding an intervention
should raise our subjective probability in a process hypoth-
esis to 1, in practice, finding an intervention will never actually
confirm the process hypothesis. We will raise our confidence
in the process hypothesis more or less depending on the qual-
ity of our evidence for the intervention. How much our confi-
dence is raised should be assessed on a case-by-case basis,
and how one ought to determine this is an important step for
future work on process tracing methodologies. However, in-
terventions remain a key source of evidence for the productive
continuity of social mechanisms when compared to such
sources as regularities and CPOs.
3.3.1 Are counterfactuals supported by regularities?
Before finishing, let me anticipate one potential objection to
using counterfactual support for productive continuity. Au-
thors like Fearon argue that the best support for counterfactuals
comes through “invoking general principles, theories, laws, or
regularities.”40 A critic could thus suppose that getting counter-
factual evidence for productive continuity is no different from
using regularities as per MDC’s framework. This would under-
mine my argument against regularities, since counterfactuals
would then simply be regularities in disguise.
The answer to this criticism lies in the way we interpret
Fearon’s “regularities.” A straightforward regularity like the
ones used in biology (e.g. that depolarization will work in the
38
 Van Evera 1997, Beach and Pedersen 2013, Bennett and Checkel
2015.
39
 According to Van Evera, we can use the predictions a claim
implies (e.g., the predicted existence of an intervention) to test whether
that claim explains a causal relation satisfactorily. A smoking gun test
is a set of “predictions of high uniqueness and no certitude” (Van
Evera 1997, 40). Passing a smoking gun test strongly corroborates a
claim (due to its uniqueness), but failing to pass such a test does not
strongly undermine a claim. After all, as Van Evera says, “suspects
not seen with a smoking gun are not proven innocent.” (Van Evera
1997, 40). Finding evidence for an intervention can strongly corrobo-
rate a causal claim.
40
 Fearon 1991: 176.
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same way in different places or cases under the same condi-
tions) is inaccessible for singular social science cases. The
support referred to by Fearon must therefore be of a different
type, and indeed it is. Consider Fearon’s example of a general
principle one might invoke in describing the influence of nuclear
weapons on the postwar world (from John Mueller’s 1988
study): “Wars are not begun out of casual caprice or idle fancy,
but because one country or another decides that it can profit
from (not simply win) the war—the combination of risk, gain,
and cost appears preferable to peace.”41 Comparing this gen-
eral principle to the MDC regularity that presynaptic neurons,
in the same circumstances, always release neurotransmitter
molecules in a certain way indicates the difference between
support for the productive continuity of biological and social
mechanisms. The former is exacting, describing a particular
cause-effect relationship that recurs in the same way under the
same conditions. The latter is at best a guiding general prin-
ciple, not a specific recurring relationship. As such, the de-
mand for counterfactual support is not simply the call for regu-
larities as per MDC in disguise. Indeed, following my logic in
the preceding section, I would argue that the use of general
principles as in Mueller’s study are only supportive of produc-
tive continuity if such general principles can be used to sup-
port a specific intervention claim that implies that if the cause
had not been present, the effect would not have followed, all
other things being equal.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, I have analysed three kinds of support for as-
sessing the productive continuity of social mechanisms: regu-
larities, causal process observations, and interventions. I have
shown that regularities, because of the dissimilarities between
social and biological activities, often cannot provide support
for social mechanisms’ productive continuity. I have also shown
that causal process observations do not commonly provide
support for productive continuity, since they are not focused
on providing support for the causal connection between the
links of a causal chain. Finally, I outlined how counterfactual
evidence can provide support for social mechanisms, in the
form of Woodward’s interventions, and finished with some
concrete requirements that this evidence must meet. Future
work should determine exactly how Woodwardian interven-
tions can provide a smoking gun test for process tracing hy-
potheses.42
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Invariant Causal Mechanisms
David Waldner
University of Virginia
Why Causal Mechanisms are Not Variables
Qualitative methodologists generally treat process tracing
methods and a mechanistic view of causation as natural allies.
Two conjoined propositions form the basis for this alliance.
The first proposition is that the identification of causal mecha-
nisms is the sine qua non of distinguishing causal relations
from mere correlations. The second proposition is that pro-
cess-tracing methods are uniquely qualified to identify these
critical causal mechanisms. In one admirably pithy formula-
tion, Gary Goertz and James Mahoney state categorically: “No
strong causal inference without process tracing.”1 There ap-
pears to be a tacit consensus that process tracing is both
necessary and sufficient for causal inference.
One can applaud the development of process-tracing meth-
ods without making such strong claims on its behalf. It would
behoove us, first of all, to distinguish causal inference from
causal explanation. We make inferences about the existence of
a causal relationship by claiming that an observed association
is not merely correlational. We can do this qualitatively, by
making claims about necessary and sufficient conditions, or
we can do this quantitatively, by making claims about unbi-
ased estimates of causal effects. Philosophers who are in gen-
eral sympathetic to mechanistic conceptions of causation have
been quick to point out that inferences can and frequently are
made without explicit reference to causal mechanisms.2 Even
as we affirm that the analysis of causal mechanisms can be a
powerful tool in causal inference, there is no reason to reject
experiments and design-based statistical studies as equally
powerful instruments of causal inference.3 We make causal
explanations, on the other hand, by invoking causes. In previ-
ous work, I have argued that a complete causal explanation
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2016, where I had the benefit of comments from David Collier and Sid
Tarrow and the pleasure of learning from my co-panelists, Andy
Bennett, Derek Beach and Sherry Zaks. Post-conference conversa-
tions with Gerardo Munck, Sayres Rudy, and Alan Jacobs improved
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1
 Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 103. See also Bennett and Checkel
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requires the identification of the relevant mechanisms, but even
on this point, philosophers sympathetic to a mechanistic per-
spective on mechanisms dissent; Harold Kincaid, to give one
example, has argued cogently that no universal claim for mecha-
nism-based explanation is reasonable.4
Moreover, reading various literatures on the discovery of
causal mechanisms in disparate scientific disciplines makes it
hard to credit the claim that “process-tracing methods are ar-
guably the only method that allows us to study causal mecha-
nisms.”5 It may be the case that process-tracing methods are
particularly well-suited to studying mechanisms in social sci-
ence fields like Political Science, but this claim requires an
auxiliary argument about why the social sciences differ from
natural sciences and why that difference makes process trac-
ing particularly well suited for studying social science mecha-
nisms.
Finally, it is worth revisiting the vexing question of whether
our current conceptual understanding of causal mechanisms
is adequate to the tremendous inferential and explanatory bur-
dens we process tracers place upon them. In a 2001 review
essay, James Mahoney identified approximately two-dozen
definitions of causal mechanisms. Somewhat alarmingly,
Mahoney noted that many of these definitions do not clearly
distinguish causation from correlation.6 In the intervening
years, political scientists have made some important progress
defining causal mechanisms, yet skeptics remain, even among
political scientists who are sympathetic to process tracing.7
Much more work remains to be done: a recent commentary on
process-tracing methods by a sympathetic philosopher con-
cludes that “the social science literature has been preoccupied
more with how mechanisms are found or theorized, and with
the role they play in explanation and theory, and less with
developing a definition that captures the essential elements of
mechanisms or that applies to all scientific contexts.”8
Yet it is not clear that we can make much progress by way
of definition.  Many of us, myself included, endorse a “genera-
tive” definition of causal mechanisms, as entities that generate
an outcome of interest.9 There are various definitions in the
philosophical literature that expand on this core definition, but
all of them ultimately contain some version of the claim that
causal mechanisms produce an outcome. Thus, we end up
defining causation in terms of causal mechanisms and causal
mechanisms in terms of generating or producing outcomes—
that is to say, in terms of causation.
My recommendation is that we put an end to worrying
about a unified and singular definition of causal mechanisms
and that we instead focus on what property a mechanism must
possess in order to perform its inferential and explanatory func-
tions. By distinguishing properties from functions, my inten-
4
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5
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 Mahoney 2001.
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 Runhardt 2015, 453.
9
 Mahoney 2001, 580; George and Bennett 2005, 137; Waldner
2012.
